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Abstract 
Using data from the auction of vehicle quota licenses in Singapore, we study if 
revenue equivalence holds when the auction format was switched from a 
sealed-bid format (May 1990 to June 2001) to an open bidding format since 
July 2001.  Our econometric analysis indicates the change in auction format 
led to a change in bidding behavior. On average, the quota license premium 
under the open bidding format is about US$1,000 (about 7.5% of the Category 
E license price in June 2001) lower, compared to the forecast level that would 
have prevailed if there had been no change in the auction format.   
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I. Introduction 
This paper studies the bidding behavior in a multi-object uniform price auction, 
under both the sealed-bid and open formats.  The context of our study is the Vehicle Quota 
System (VQS) in Singapore, which was implemented in May 1990.  Under the VQS, a 
prospective car buyer must first obtain a vehicle quota license, referred to as a Certificate of 
Entitlement (or more commonly, COE).  Each quota license allows a vehicle to be on the 
roads for ten years.  Until June 2001, the vehicle licenses were allocated through a sealed-
bid uniform price auction that was held monthly.1  Following a government review of the 
VQS, an open online bidding format was implemented in phases from July 2001 onwards. 
From July 2001 to March 2002, two auctions were conducted each month, one using the 
sealed-bid format and the other using the open-bid format.  This ‘overlapping’ phase is 
essentially a learning phase for bidders to get acquainted with the online system, and to 
fine-tune the bidding system.  From April 2002, the fortnightly vehicle licenses auctions 
were conducted using the open bidding format (during the first and third weeks of each 
month).  The switch from a sealed-bid format to an open bidding format for the quota 
license auctions offers us a unique opportunity to study the issue of the choice of auction 
format and its implications on the auction revenue generated. 
A important result in auction theory is the revenue equivalence theorem, which 
states that if identical objects are auctioned in a simultaneous auction where the set of 
winners are those who submit the highest bids, and where valuations are independent and 
participants are risk-neutral, then it does not matter whether the auction is conducted in a 
sealed-bid format or as in an open format.  The revenue equivalence theorem, as first 
proven in Vickrey (1961), and subsequently generalized in Myerson (1981) and Riley and 
Samuelson (1981), implies that all standard auctions, such as the first-price sealed-bid 
                                                 
1    The first auction was held in May 1990, which covered the period May to July 1990. From 
August 1990 to June 2001, the auction was conducted monthly, and from July 2001 onwards, twice a 
month.  
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auction (where each winner pays his own bid), the second price sealed-bid auction (where 
the winners pay the highest rejected bid), the open outcry ascending (English) auction, or 
the open outcry descending (Dutch) auction are equivalent in terms of the expected revenue 
generated for each object auctioned. 
However, if the assumptions of independent valuations or risk neutrality do not 
hold, then the different auctions rank differently in terms of their expected revenue 
generated per object put up for auction.  Specifically, when the participants in an auction 
are risk-averse but valuations are independent, a first-price sealed-bid auction will generate 
higher revenue than an open uniform-price auction (as shown in Maskin and Riley, 1984).  
The intuition behind this result is that if individuals are risk-averse, they would bid more 
aggressively in a sealed-bid auction to increase the probability of winning, by giving up 
some of the net payoff conditional on winning an allocation.2   
On the other hand, if bidders are risk-neutral and valuations are not independent, 
but affiliated3 so that there is a common-value element in the bidders’ valuations, the 
second-price open (i.e. ascending English outcry) auctions will generate higher expected 
revenue than the second-price sealed-bid auction, which in turn, dominates the first-price 
sealed-bid auction.  The underlying principle at work here is the greater informational 
linkage among bidders in the open auction format that allows bidders to revise their 
valuations as the auction takes place (see Milgrom and Weber, 1982).  A recent paper that 
                                                 
2   Since the second-price sealed-bid auction is strategically equivalent to the uniform-price open 
auction, bidding one’s valuation is the dominant strategy in both cases. Hence, even if participants 
are risk averse, the revenue equivalence principle continues to hold for the second-price auctions 
when bidders’ valuations are private values.  
3  Roughly speaking, if one bidder observes a favorable signal regarding some relevant aspect of the 
bidding environment, it makes the conditional probability of favorable values for the other relevant 
aspects more likely.  The practical implication for bidding behavior under the VQS is that if a 
participant in the quota license auction is willing to submit a higher bid because he observes a signal 
that demand for cars is likely to be higher (due to, say, seasonal demand), then he should think that 
other bidders are also prepared to do so.  In other words, if one bidder forecasts a higher price, then 
he should expect that other bidders should also forecast higher prices.   
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examines the revenue equivalence hypothesis in an experimental context is Chew and 
Nishimura (2003). 
In the context of the quota license auctions in Singapore, the valuation of a vehicle 
license is not strictly private value, since the bids that car buyers are willing to submit, 
through the car dealers, are dependent on the expected vehicle demand in each auction, the 
available quota in future auctions, as well as the outlook on the economy, etc.  Hence, if car 
buyers are risk averse and the valuations that they place on vehicle licenses are affiliated, 
the switch of the quota license auction from a sealed-bid format to an open online format 
should produce an empirical difference in the bidding behavior and the revenue generated 
per quota license.  This provides the motivation for our study in this paper.   
To study if revenue equivalence holds, we constructed an econometric model for 
the quota license auction under the sealed-bid format (for the period January 1996 to June 
2001), and then use the estimated model to forecast the quota license premium under the 
open online auction format.  The hypothesis we are testing is that if revenue equivalence 
holds, the estimated regression model should produce close estimates for the quota license 
premiums under the open online format (specifically, for the period of our study from May 
2002 to March 2003).  Based on our analysis, we found evidence to support the view that 
the revenue equivalence does not hold following the switch in the auction format of the 
VQS.  Our analysis shows that the auction revenue generated under the open online auction 
format are lower than would have been the case if the sealed-bid format had continued to 
be in place.   
Although a number of studies have been conducted to assess the equity and 
efficiency of the VQS – among them, Phang (1993), Koh and Lee (1994), Phang, Wong 
and Chia (1996), Chin and Smith (1997), Tan (2001) and Koh (2003) – this paper is the 
first to test if revenue equivalence holds for Singapore’s quota auction.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II provides a brief review of 
the VQS in Singapore.  Section III discusses the issues involved in modeling the vehicle 
 5
quota license auctions.  Section IV presents the econometric model and discusses the 
results from the forecasting exercise and its implications for testing if revenue equivalence 
holds.  Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. The Vehicle Quota System in Singapore 
The VQS was introduced in May 1990 to control the growth of the motor vehicle 
population.  A vehicle registered with a quota license has an initial lifespan of ten years.  At 
the end of this period, the owner may either deregister the vehicle or renew the vehicle 
license for a further 5-year or 10-year period, by paying a “prevailing quota license 
premium”, calculated as the three-month moving average of the quota license premium.   
Under the VQS, motor vehicles are classified into several categories, with a separate 
license quota for each category.  When first introduced in 1990, there were seven quota 
license categories, namely: Category 1 for cars of 1000 cc and below; Category 2 for cars 
of 1001-1600 cc and below, and taxis; Category 3 for cars of 1601-2000 cc and below; 
Category 4 for cars of above 2000 cc; Category 5 for goods vehicles and buses; Category 6 
for motorcycles; Category 7, an “Open” category for registration of all types of vehicles.   
Every quota year beginning in May, the quota for new vehicles is determined based 
on the target growth rate in the car population and the forecast number of de-registrations. 
The Land Transport Authority of Singapore (LTA) releases on its website 
(http://www.lta.gov.sg) the exact calculations for the target vehicle population and the 
number of licenses available for auction each month. 4   The projected quota for each 
category is allocated equally over twelve months.  To allow flexibility in the composition 
of the vehicle population, 25% of the deregistered vehicles in each category are allotted to 
                                                 
4    Since the change in the total vehicle population is given by the number of new registrations less 
the number of de-registrations, the total number of quota licenses available for auction each year is 
equal to the sum of the target vehicle population, the projected number of de-registrations and 
unallocated quota carried forward from the previous year.   
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the “Open” category, where the licenses can be used to register vehicles belonging to any 
category.   
Since 1990, the VQS has undergone a number of modifications.  Some of the major 
changes include: (i) the quota licenses were initially transferable but made non-transferable 
following public anger over speculative activities; (ii) a “weekend” car quota license 
category was also introduced in May 1991, but discontinued in 1994 due to lack of 
popularity; (iii) the number of quota categories was reduced to five in 1999 with the merger 
of Categories 1 and 2 to form category A, and the merger of Categories 3 and 4 to form 
Category B.  The other categories were renamed accordingly; (iv) the introduction of an 
open bidding format for quota licenses, in phases from July 2001 onwards.  Figure 1 below 
shows the movements in the quota license premiums from May 1990 to March 2003. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
Following a government review in 1999, the format of the license auction was 
changed to an open format.  The switch was carried in several phases, beginning in July 
2001 for the Open category license. The open auction is conducted online in real time, at 
the website of the LTA.  Each online auction takes place over three days, at the beginning 
and middle of the month. Bidders can see the market-clearing bids in real time, and use the 
information to update their valuations, decide to enter or drop out of the auction, or revise 
their bids on-line.   
The market-clearing bid is the lowest successful bid.  As there many participants in 
the license auctions, the distribution of bids is approximately continuous; hence, the lowest 
successful bid is generally be close to the highest rejected bid, so that the license auction is 
a second-price auction. Although a license auction may be over-subscribed, not all the 
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quota licenses may be allocated.  This is because there is no tie-breaking procedure for 
identical bids at the market-clearing level.  These bids are treated as unsuccessful bids, and 
the next highest bid sets the license premium. The unallocated licenses are carried over to 
the next auction.  
As of June 2003, a total of 905,281 licenses were auctioned in 156 auctions. In 
total, these auctions generated revenue totaling S$20.22 billion (US$11.55 billion) for the 
Singapore government (source: LTA).   Each auction yielded an average revenue of 
S$129.05 million (US$74.06 million), and each quota license issued since May 1990 had 
cost an average of S$22,334 (US$12,762).  Tables 1 and 2 show the average quota license 
premiums and its volatility, respectively. The calculations were based on an exchange rate 
of US$1 to S$1.75.  
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE 
                             --------------------------------------------------- 
 
III. Modeling the Quota License Auction 
We briefly discuss the main considerations in modeling the quota license auctions.  
First, we note that the VQS is an example of an affiliated-values repeated multiple-object 
auction.  In other words, the valuations of bidders and the sealed bids that they submit have 
a common-value element.  The participants in these auctions form expectations about the 
intensity of demand in each auction, based on their assessment of the economic 
environment and the anticipated vehicle demand in the current and future auctions.  
Bidders’ beliefs and expectations, as well as their decision to participate in a particular 
auction, may be based on both private information and public information (such as the 
outlook on economic growth and interest rates, changes in government policies, and 
modifications to vehicle quota system, etc.).   
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Additionally, announcements of changes in future license quotas will lead to 
revisions in the expectations of future quota premiums, and this will affect bidders’ 
decision to participate in a particular auction – either postponing participation or bringing 
forward the participation.  Auction participants may also study the bid distributions of 
previous auctions (available from September 1994 to June 2001 for the sealed-bid format).    
Conditional on the public information and their private information, each car buyer 
computes his valuations for the quota licenses in each auction.  As shown in Milgrom and 
Weber (1982) and Klemperer (1999), for second-price auctions with affiliated valuations, 
each player’s optimal strategy is to bid as if as he is the marginal successful bidder.   
The difference between the sealed-bid and open auction format is the stronger 
informational linkage under the open auction.  Under the sealed-bid format, bidders 
submitted their bids independently and did not have the opportunity to observe other bids 
and revise their valuations.  In contrast, under the open auction, car buyers can monitor the 
market clearing price in real time, and then decide if they should participate in the auction, 
revise their bids or drop out of the auction (e.g. by not raising their bids above the 
prevailing market-clearing bids).  The greater transparency of the open auction provides 
stronger informational linkage.   
Therefore, if risk aversion among car buyers is small, an application of the results 
of Milgrom and Weber (1982) should lead us to expect that the switch to the open online 
auction format for the vehicle license auction (which is akin to an English outcry second-
price auction) will produce a higher expected revenue per license compared with the 
sealed-bid second-price quota license auction.  However, if risk aversion among car buyers 
is significant, this will produce a countervailing effect as the switch to an open-online 
auction, by producing greater transparency will lead to less aggressive bidding. 5   
 
 
                                                 
5  These issues are discussed in more details in Koh and Lee (1994) and Koh (2003).    
 9
IV. Econometric Analysis 
Our study focuses on the period from January 1996 to June 2001 (66 monthly 
auctions) for the sealed-bid format, and the period April 2002 to March 2003 (24 
fortnightly auctions) for the open online format. Although data from 1990 to 1995 on the 
sealed-bid auctions were available, we exclude them from our study in order to minimize 
the impact of structural changes in the economy on the econometric analysis.  The data on 
the license auctions are obtained from LTA’s website, while the macro-economic data were 
obtained from the website of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (http://www.mas.gov.sg) 
and the Department of Statistics, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore 
(http://www.singstat.gov.sg).   
Under the open online auction, bidders whose valuations are lower than the market 
clearing bids will not enter the auction.  Thus, the realized bid distributions under open 
auction format are necessarily truncated distributions, since the data from participants who 
had chosen not to enter the auction are not captured.  It is therefore not appropriate to use 
the bid distributions of the open auction to compute a measure of the demand comparable 
to the bid-quota ratio under the sealed-bid format.   We have elected to construct an 
econometric model of the demand for quota licenses based macro-economic factors. 
The forecasting model is constructed as follows. The demand for vehicle licenses is 
a function of car demand, which is in turn influenced by the macro-economic environment.  
The appropriate macro-economic indicators to use are Singapore’s industrial production 
and non-oil exports; these are reported on a monthly basis and impact the economic outlook, 
consumer confidence and purchasing behavior.  Other variables used to construct the 
econometric model are the interest rate differentials of the 3-month commercial bank paper 
and the 5-year Singapore government bond, against the 3-month Singapore Treasury bill 
rates.  The use of bond-bill spread and paper-bill spread as a predictor of economic activity 
has been documented by Stock and Watson (1989), Bernanke (1990), Friedman and 
Knutter (1992), Harvey (1991, 1997) and Tse (1998).  We consider the first-order 
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differences in the monthly license premiums as function of the interest rate differentials and 
the first-order differences in the non-oil exports and the industrial production indices.   
Our objective is to examine if the revenue equivalence result holds for the vehicle 
quota license auctions under the sealed-bid and the open online formats.  Using the 
estimated econometric model for the sealed-bid auction, for the period of January 1996 to 
June 2001, we apply the model to forecast the quota license premiums in the open auction 
from April 2002 to March 2003.6    
We shall use the following notation in the forecasting model.  Let tP  denote the 
quota license premium (i.e. the market clearing winning bid); tNOE  denote the level of 
non-oil exports; tIP  denote the index of industrial production; tPBS denote the interest rate 
differential of 3-month commercial bank paper over the 3-month Treasury bill; tTS denote 
the interest rate differential of the 5-year government bond over the 3-month Treasury bill.  
We shall consider the following first-order differences in the regression equation. Let 
1t t tP P P−∆ ≡ −  denote the monthly variation in quota license premiums.  We similarly 
define tNOE∆  and tIP∆  to be the monthly change in the non-oil exports and industrial 
production, respectively.   We estimate the following econometric model:7   
tP∆  = 0 1 2 3 4t t t tNOE IP PBS TSβ β β β β+ ∆ + ∆ + +                           (1) 
For the estimation of the above econometric model, we consider the quota license 
auctions in Categories 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 from January 1996 to June 2001.  We focus on the 
                                                 
6   In June 2003, the data for industrial production and non-oil export were available up to March 
2003.  
7  Clearly, we can fine-tune the methodology used to construct the econometric model.  For instance, 
we could include other economic variables, such as inflation rates and stock market indices that may 
have an impact on the bidding behavior of car buyers.  Furthermore, we could introduce appropriate 
lags in the regression estimation.  However, the qualitative aspects of our results are likely to remain 
the same. 
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household demand for passenger cars, and exclude Categories 5 (goods vehicles and buses) 
and 6 (motorcycles) from our study, as these categories are largely for commercial 
purposes.   
As we noted earlier, in May 1999, Categories 1 and 2 were merged to form 
Category A, while Categories 3 and 4 were merged to form Category B.  Category 7 was 
renamed as Category E. For the purpose of data continuity, we have decided to calculate, 
for the period of January 1996 to April 1999, an index of the quota license premiums for 
Categories 1 and 2, weighted by the number of quota licenses in each category, to proxy for 
a “Category A” quota license premium.  A similar index is constructed for Categories 3 and 
4 over the same period.    
We also noted earlier that between July 2001 to March 2002, the open online 
format was gradually introduced, beginning with the “Open” category, and was conducted 
alternately with the sealed-bid format.  Specifically, the sealed-bid format was conducted at 
the beginning of each month, while the open online format was conducted in the middle of 
the month.  During this period, adjustments were made to various aspects of the online 
open-auction format, as bidders learnt to use the system.  In light of the fine-tuning that 
took place during the initial months of the open-auction format, we have decided to exclude 
this “overlapping” phase of nine months for the purpose of testing if the revenue 
equivalence proposition holds after the change in the bidding format for the license 
auctions.   
Finally, we wish to point out that the Singapore economy was largely stable over 
2001 to 2002.  Therefore, although there was a nine-month gap between the cessation of the 
fully sealed-bid auction format in June 2001 and the start of the fully online open-auction 
format in April 2002, the macro-economic environment in Singapore was largely 
unchanged, so that the econometric forecasting model remains valid for the purpose of our 
study.    
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Results 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 3.  Using the estimated 
regression equations, we forecast the quota license premiums for the period April 2002 to 
March 2003 under the open online format. We then compare the forecast quota license 
premiums with the actual quota license premiums to compute the forecast errors, which are 
presented in Table 4.   
 
------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4  HERE 
                             ------------------------------------------------ 
 
We checked the robustness of the econometric model under the sealed-bid system 
as follows.  We estimated the model for 58 observations, from September 1994 to 
November 2000, and used it to predict the quota license premiums for the sealed-bid 
auctions from December 2000 to May 2001 (six months).  The forecast errors of the license 
premiums in these auctions were statistically not significant.  Varying the estimation 
sample up to 60 observations with the corresponding forecast observations down to 4 data 
points produced similar results.  Thus, we conclude that there was no structural break in the 
model under the sealed-bid auction format, as indicated by its success in providing 
unbiased post-sample forecasts.  Failure of the model in providing unbiased forecasts under  
the open-auction format is therefore attributed to the structural break in bidding behavior, 
caused by the switch to a different auction format. 
As is evident from Table 4, the forecast errors are negative for all three quota 
categories, and are statistically significant at the 5% level for Categories B and E.  The 
results suggest that revenue equivalence does not hold following the switch from the 
sealed-bid format to the open online format.  The switch in the auction format appeared to 
have produced a dampening impact on the auction revenue per license.  
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The results suggest that by providing greater transparency, the open online format 
also led to less aggressive bidding in the license auctions.  A plausible explanation that is 
consistent with this result is that risk aversion among bidders is significant, so that bidding 
behavior had been particularly aggressive under the sealed-bid format of the license 
auctions.   
Table 5 below presents the estimated net impact on auction revenue in each quota 
license auction, following the switch in the auction format.  The cumulative impact from 
May 2002 to March 2003 is an estimated decrease of S$128,323,108 (or US$73,327,490) in 
auction revenue.  This translates into average difference of S$2,040 (or US$1,166) for the 
62,900 quota licenses auctioned in the three categories during this period.  The price of a 
Category E license in June 2001 is S$27,048; thus, the average difference of S$2,040 
represents an estimated 7.5% drop in license price over the period May 2002 to March 
2003.   
The estimated reduction in auction revenue does not affect in any significant 
manner the government’s fiscal position.  Since the reduction in uncertainty over cost of car 
ownership is an important issue for car buyers, it is likely that net social welfare has 
improved as a result of the switch to the open online auction format. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 5  HERE 
                             ------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
V. Concluding Comments 
Since the VQS was introduced in 1990, it has been suggested many times by the 
Singaporean public for a change in the format of the quota license auction from a sealed-
bid format to an open format.  The basic argument put forward was that the sealed-bid 
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format puts car buyers at a disadvantage as they were not able to learn about the market 
conditions and bid appropriately.  As a result, car buyers typically delegated the bidding 
decision to the car distributors, who determined the bids to submit, on behalf of the car 
buyers.  In fact, the common practice is for car dealers to offer a bundled package, with a 
“subsidy” for a quota license if the car buyer lets the dealer bid on his behalf. 
The results in this paper indicate that revenue equivalence does not hold in the case 
of the quota license auction in Singapore.  Furthermore, it also  provides support for the 
view that an open auction is beneficial for car buyers, as each car buyer stands to save an 
average of about S$2000 (or about US$1100) – roughly 7.5% of the price of a Category E 
quota license in June 2001 –   for a vehicle license that they must obtain.   With greater 
transparency and less uncertainty, buyers are better off under the open auction system. 
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TABLE 1:  
Annual Average Quota License Premiums 
(Singapore dollars) 
 
 
Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4 Cat 5 Cat 6 Cat 7 Cat 8
1990 2,686 4,694 6,195 2,007 708 205 5,545
1991 5,207 6,734 8,047 8,049 2,095 244 8,644 4,640
1992 14,864 18,717 20,457 20,138 6,536 1 23,413 13,355
1993 21,142 25,802 26,742 24,681 18,365 1 26,880 15,340
1994 26,945 42,622 68,757 74,749 28,289 291 72,606 28,383
1995 21,057 39,830 55,338 60,966 26,092 2,677 57,888
1996 19,191 43,447 45,525 47,683 26,415 2,585 48,361
1997 33,075 54,128 66,949 66,925 33,658 2,977 67,425
1998 28,668 34,504 28,803 34,303 16,891 731 32,751
Max 41,008 62,208 95,100 100,500 39,000 4,202 105,000 45,300
Date Jun 97 Jun 97 Nov 94 Dec 94 Dec 94 Nov 95 Nov 94 Sep 94
Cat C Cat D Cat E
1999 24,645 770 42,683
2000 19,936 1,332 36,961
2001 16,878 814 27,891
2002 19,317 225 23,395
2003 11,354 263 29,093
30,896 31,982
37,845 36,189
26,987 28,379
29,236 29,142
Cat A Cat B
40,242 43,068
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TABLE 2:  
Volatility of Quota License Premiums 
(Singapore dollars) 
 
 
Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4 Cat 5 Cat 6 Cat 7 Cat 8
1990 1,754 3,022 3,857 2,216 759 117 3,046
1991 3,600 3,767 5,022 6,005 2,643 235 5,436 2,791
1992 3,470 4,639 5,410 7,542 1,924 0 4,124 2,460
1993 6,635 7,081 9,005 9,487 7,987 0 8,946 2,951
1994 4,977 7,062 14,165 19,442 5,978 694 17,760 8,507
1995 4,680 4,878 9,246 7,244 4,227 778 11,489
1996 3,643 2,800 6,166 2,444 3,266 535 3,707
1997 5,349 6,587 6,543 6,740 1,796 438 6,347
1998 4,069 5,996 12,711 9,006 5,594 341 6,332
Cat C Cat D Cat E
1999 6,750 276 6,662
2000 6,880 247 8,639
2001 6,990 239 3,616
2002 4,557 268 6,260
2003 676 320 2,472
8,912 4,933
2,475 4,202
1,786 2,440
10,962 12,193
4,815 11,257
Cat A Cat B
 
 
     
 
Notes for Tables 1 and 2: 
a.    The figures reported here are for each calendar year.  The figures for 2003 are up to 
end-June. 
b.  The annual average quota license premiums are calculated as weighted averages of 
the monthly quota license premiums.  The weights are the number of quota licenses 
available for tender each month.  In some cases, the weighted average quota license 
premiums differ substantially from simple monthly average quota license premiums.   
c.    The volatility of quota license premiums is calculated as the standard deviation of 
monthly quota license premiums. 
Source: Land Transport Authority of Singapore (http://www.lta.gov.sg) 
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TABLE 3: 
Estimation of the Econometric Model for January 1996 to June 2001 
 
                                      Quota License Category 
        Category A         Category B         Category E 
              0β       −324.977 (−0.188)          1204.863 (0.418)          2111.729 (1.290)
              1β               0.327 (0.269)            −2.310 (−1.140)            −0.181 (−0.157) 
             2β           −8.517 (−0.110)           115.436 (0.896)               1.467 (0.020)
             3β     −907.9141 (−0.680)     −5182.020 (−2.326)     −3324.959 (−2.628)
             4β          215.088 (0.243)         1123.713 (0.762)       −100.768 (−0.120)
       R-squared                0.010               0.107               0.109 
     Durbin Watson               1.104               2.63               1.342 
 No. of Observations                    64                   64                   64 
 
Notes:   
1.   The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
2.   As Categories 1 and 2 were merged to form Category A in April 1999, an index of the 
quota license premiums for Categories 1 and 2, weighted by the number of quota licenses 
in each category, is constructed to proxy for a “Category A” license premium over the 
period January 1996 to April 1999,.  A similar index is constructed for Categories 3 and 4 
over the same period for a “Category B” license premium. 
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TABLE 4: 
Forecast Errors in Quota License Premiums: May 2002 to March 2003 
 
Forecast Errors of Quota License Premiums  
(in Singapore dollars) 
 Category A Category B Category E 
-1,913 -5,200 -2,605 May 2002  
-2,311 -9,792 -5,249 
-1,814 -10,419 -6,894 Jun  2002 
-2,943 -8,921 -7,178 
-1,915 -1,509 -3,389 Jul  2002 
203 -2,582 -3,358 
-1,064 -1,945 -2,040 Aug  2002 
546 -258 -83 
464 -2,554 -2,011 Sep 2002 
-2,628 -6,274 -4,107 
877 162 -1,874 Oct 2002 
2,393 2,786 -68 
-2,309 -4,005 -4,454 Nov 2003 
-1,838 -2,687 -4,260 
230 -7,804 -1,448 Dec 2003 
-1,173 -11,537 -2,822 
-309 3,989 -903 Jan 2003 
-791 3,317 -1,120 
3,022 2,442 2,840 Feb 2003 
4,008 3,555 624 
-2,744 -7,494 -8,355 Mar 2003 
-3,049 -6,534 -6,053 
Mean -685 -3,330 -2,946 
Standard Deviation 1,979.525 4,856.062 2,750.370 
t-Statistics -1.62308 -3.21641 -5.02404 
 
Note:   
The forecast error in quota license premium is calculated by comparing the predicted quota 
license premiums and the actual license premiums.  If revenue equivalence holds, the 
forecast errors should be statistically insignificant. 
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TABLE 5: 
Estimated Impact on Auction Revenue following the switch to an Open Auction Format:  
May 2002 to March 2003 
 
Estimated impact  on auction revenue 
(in Singapore dollars) 
 Category A Category B Category E 
-2,155,625 -2,693,379 -2,422,322 May 2002  
-2,495,568 -5,297,241 -4,603,063 
-2,004,973 -5,928,495 -6,466,709 Jun  2002 
-3,334,935 -4,942,316 -6,747,457 
-2,122,155 -840,424 -3,060,244 Jul  2002 
226,616 -1,427,757 -3,035,609 
-1,186,609 -1,079,361 -1,834,167 Aug  2002 
600,355 -139,983 -73,742 
514,137 -1,412,482 -1,846,140 Sep 2002 
-2,938,079 -3,570,030 -3,835,981 
965,600 89,685 -1,707,646 Oct 2002 
2,656,254 1,535,184 -61,969 
-3,108,196 -2,655,529 -4,823,565 Nov 2003 
-2,441,142 -1,604,332 -4,660,322 
304,294 -4,830,966 -1,594,777 Dec 2003 
-1,568,064 -8,399,277 -3,053,923 
-412,621 2,820,195 -988,167 Jan 2003 
-1,048,181 2,192,511 -1,231,166 
4,046,460 1,602,221 3,095,622 Feb 2003 
5,350,682 2,343,016 676,438 
-5,461,108 -4,968,576 -8,614,457 Mar 2003 
-2,155,625 -2,693,379 -2,422,322 
Cumulative Impact -21,476,615 -43,389,148 -63,457,345 
 
Note: 
The estimated revenue impact is calculated by taking the forecast error and multiplying it by the 
number of vehicle licenses allocated each month. 
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FIGURE 1: 
Quota License Premiums May 1990 to June 2003 
(Singapore dollars) 
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